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The Implicit Teaching Of Utopian Speculations:
Rousseau's Contribution To The Natural Law
Tradition
Thomas E. Carbonneau*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal philosophers, especially of the positivist variety, traditionally have assumed that the proponents of natural law theory
present too facile an answer to the vexed question of whether an
unjust law can be said to exist when it is duly sanctioned by legal
and political authority. If not disappointed by the answer itself,
they have been most unhappy with the explanation that accompanies it and, indeed, are prepared to challenge the very foundations of a theory of law which pays so little heed-either empirically or in terms of pure logic-to the actual operations of existing
legal systems. Kant initiated the rebellion against the lawmorality equation by distinguishing them as two separate spheres
of activity.) Subsequent philosophers, thanks to the analogy between legal rules and the rules of a game, inaugurated the movement towards the purely systemic analysis of law.'
* Currently Jervey Fellow, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University; Dipl6me d'ltudes Superieures-3e Degr6, Universitd de Poitiers, 1971;
A.B., Bowdoin College, 1972; B.A., Oxford University, 1975; J.D., University of Virginia,
1978; M.A., Oxford University, 1979; M.A., University of Virginia, 1979.
1. See J. NEWMAN, CONSCIENCE VERSUS LAW 96 (1971). Kant's formal distinction
between law and morality consisted in characterizing legality as the "accommodation
inter se of the external liberty of men in community" and morality as the "regulation intra
se of the internal liberty of the individual man by way of the dictates of his private
conscience." Id.
2. One of the early advocates of positivism, the view of law which defines legality not
as the conformity of laws to transcendent principles but rather as the expression of the
essential operative features of the legal system, was John Austin. In his Lectures on
Jurisprudence,first published in 1869, he defined law essentially in terms of reason and
physical force: law is "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an
intelligent being having power over him." J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, pt. 1,
lec. I, sec. 2 (R. Campbell ed. 1875). The notion of law as a rule functioning within a neatly
defined system laid the groundwork for the more modem positivist assessments of law,
i.e., the appraisal of legal phenomena in terms of a system of logically contrived rules,
the operation of which is distinct, although not necessarily different, from considerations
of morality. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); H. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). American legal realists also were drawn to this type of systemic
analysis, although in a less sophisticated way. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). In retrospect, Hobbes was a precursor of legal positivism. See
J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 81-83.
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The critical reaction to natural law, however, misconstrues
its essential purpose. Natural law theory is not meant to provide
insight into scientific or quasi-scientific phenomena, but rather
it is aimed at and actually is a product of man's humanity and
speaks most eloquently of it. As Jacques Maritain has defined it,
it is
an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and
to attune
according to which the human will must act in order
3
being.
human
the
of
ends
necessary
the
itself to
To its proponents, natural law is law and imposes obligations on
man "from the simple fact that man is man."' It is not attached
to the particular features of any real legal system; indeed, the
primary and, possibly, the sole bond between natural law and
positive, manmade laws consists in a relationship of general
guidance. As Professor d'Entr~ves has stated:
[W]e should turn to natural law for an "illumination of problems" rather than for a "blueprint of detailed solutions. ..."
[The] natural law can shed light on a number of problems. The
nature of law, the relationship between legal and moral obligation, the necessity of referring positive law to some ideal standard: on each of these problems . . . [the] natural law has a
word to say, that, indeed, natural law is perhaps nothing other
than a name for the right answer. 5
In a word, rather than representing a finely wrought logical
appraisal of the elements of law, natural law theory symbolizes
an attitude about law and, more importantly, about man himself-a conviction about the place of law in human society and a
judgment about its content in terms of man's intrinsic nature. It
perhaps can be best described as a quest to instill meaningfulness
3. J. MARrrAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 61 (D. Anson trans. 1943)
(emphasis omitted). The original text reads:
un ordre ou une disposition que la raison humaine peut ddcouvrir et selon
laquelle la volonth humaine doit agir pour s'accorder aux fins n6cessaires de
l'6tre humain.
J. MARrAIN, LEs DRorrs DE L'HOMME rTLA LOI NATURELLE 79-80 (1942) (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of natural law as it relates to other theories of law, see Bourke, Two
Approaches to Natural Law, 1 NAT. L.F. 92 (1956); Constable, The False Natural Law:
Professor Groble's Straw Man, 1 NAT.L.F. 97; Silving, Positive NaturalLaw, 3 NAT. L.F.

24 (1958).

4. J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AN NATURAL LAW 63 (D. Anson trans. 1943)
(emphasis omitted). For the original French version, see J. MARTAIN, LEs DROITS DE
L'HoMME ET LA LO NATURELLE 82 (1942).
5. D'Entr~ves, The Case for NaturalLaw Re-examined, 1 NAT. L.F. 1, 5-6 (1956). See
generally 11 INr'L ENCY. Soc. Sci. Natural Law 80 (1968).
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in existence, as an enterprise which minimizes human limitations
and which is anchored in a deeply rooted, intuitively perceived
belief about a "common ground where we can begin to draw all
men, everywhere, together in a unity that reflects what is common to human beings as human beings."6
It is the purpose of this article to examine the evolution of
natural law theory and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's contribution to
it. The thesis that emerges from that examination asserts that the
tension between law in its natural and positive forms is endemic
to the human condition. If any common ground is to be found
between theories of positive and natural law, it lies in the realization that natural law doctrine is not gratuitous and subjective
optimism nor idealism pure and simple. The fact that natural law
doctrine can serve but a role of general guidance, that it is alien
to the concrete, positive manifestations of law, constitutes an
iihplicit statement of man's metaphysical dilemma-his inability
to fuse the ideal and the real. Rousseau's contribution to natural
law speculation lies precisely at this juncture. Unlike his mentors
who provided him with the classical natural rights framework in
which to build his political theory, Rousseau, as a literary writer
and artist, had a particularly acute sense of the dichotomy between the real and the ideal and of the corrosive effects that the
intransigent character of reality could have upon the intrinsic
aspirations of the individual. His shifting of the classical political
discourse to a literary modality reveals in a unique way the ultimate significance of natural law as a theory about law and man.
II.

THE QUEST DEFINED: THE TRIUMPH OF A MEANINGFUL
UNIVERSAL PATTERN OVER SKEPTICAL INQUIRY

Although the contours of natural law theory have been modified to meet the intellectual preoccupations of different historical
periods,7 a basic doctrinal core, premised upon an irreducible
idealism, has remained constant throughout its evolution.' Simply stated, this basic content of the theory consists in a set of
general teleological assumptions about man and the universe-more specifically, about the interrelation between what is
perceived to be an atemporal order and the legal conventions man
6. D'Entr~ves, supra note 5, at 52 (remark attributed by the author to Father
Hesburgh).
7. For a discussion of the various schools of natural law theory, see, e.g., THE NATURAL
LAW READER 47-108 (B. Brown ed. 1960); 0. GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF
Socirv 1500 To 1800 chs. 1-2 (1957).
8. See A. D'ENTRVES, NATURAL LAW 50 (1951).
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has established to govern his conduct in society.
Skeptical inquiry always has been a singularly alien methodology to the proponents of natural law theory. For example, the
Pascalian conception of law-law as a purely human contrivance
divorced from the truth of divine revelation-would have been
antithetical to their most fundamental convictions, despite their
recognition of the contingency of human affairs. According to
Pascal, 9 human life without faith amounted to a participation in
an existential void; without divine grace, man's reason was corrupt, unable to recognize, let alone identify with, transcending
truths.'0 His activity was random and inconsistent; in ultimate
terms, it was absolutely meaningless." Despite the concession
2
that natural laws "undoubtedly" exist, Pascal declared that
man was incapable of distinguishing between the natural laws
and his own artificial rules.' 3 The frailty of the human condition
was such that human laws bore no affinity to either Truth ot
Justice and varied with the whims of rulers, geographical location, and history." Customs and mores provided the only source
of stability for legal institutions and were authoritative simply
because they were accepted." Pascal reached the disparaging
conclusion that human justice was no more than a fashionable
empty social appearance-a process by which force subtly manipulated the minds of the many into believing in the illusion that
9. See B. PAsCAL, Pensees in OEURaES ComrLOTEs 493 (ed. Integrale) (L. Lafuma ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as Pensees].
10. See, e.g., id. at 503, No. 24-127; id. at 505, No. 44-82.
24-127 Condition de l'homme.
Inconstance, ennui, inquitude.
44-82 Imagination.
. . .La Justice et Ia v~ritk sont deux pointes si subtiles que nos instruments
sont trop mousses pour y toucher exactement. S'ils y arrivent ils en 6cachent la
pointe et appuient tout autour plus sur le faux que sur le vrai.
11. See, e.g., id. at 504, Nos. 37-158, 38-71, 42-207:
37-158 Mtiers.
La douceur de la gloire est si grande qu'a quelque objet qu'on l'attache, m~me
A la mort, on F'aime.
38-71 Trop et trop peu de yin.
Ne lui en donnez pas: il ne peut trouver Ia vdritA.
Donnez-lui en trop: de mime.
42-207 Combien de royaumes nous ignorent!
12. See id. at 507, No. 60-294.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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laws were just and must be obeyed.
In general, rather than confront the Pascalian dilemma on its
own terms, natural law theorists disregarded it and espoused a
more optimistic a priori vision of man's place in the universe, a
belief in a benevolent and meaningful universe containing valid
guiding principles to which men should conform their temporal
conduct and their institutions. 7 Whether pagans, Christian theologians, or secular rationalists, all natural law thinkers shared the
goal of highlighting the immutable backdrop which they believed
should underpin human activity. Rather than focus upon the
scientific or logical operation of the material components of empirical reality, they built their perception of law around their
innate sense of the meaningfulness of man's existence which was
supported not only by conceptual constructs, but also by their
deep-seated beliefs and convictions.
All of them laid claim to the existence of some sort of transcending and meaningful universal order which embodied fixed
and absolute principles, including a definition of right conduct
and a program for man's full development. They also posited that
all men shared an intrinsic nature by which they, with the help
of their reason, could identify with and participate in the universal order. The statement of a necessary concordance between the
dictates of the transcending morality and the conventional legality is the crux of traditional natural law theory. When laws ceased
to conform to the natural order of things, they lost their source
of legitimacy and functioned only in terms of the contingent,
thereby sacrificing man's sense of eternal identity and his quest
to develop to his full potential to the material demands of order
and security.
III.

THE GENESIS OF A NATURAL LAW STANDARD

As the history of various legal systems demonstrates, the
proper place of natural law precepts in a system of positive laws
is at the very top or at its periphery-providing it with the funda16. See id. at 508, No. 66-326. See also id. at 508, No. 61-309; id. at 509, No. 81-299;
id. at 510, No. 86-297; id. at 512, No. 103-298; id. at 588, No. 645-312.
17. The optimistic vision referred to in the text is especially characteristic of Rabelaisian evangelical writings. See F. RABELAIS, OEUVRES CoMPLTEs (ed. Pleiade) (J. Boulanger
& L. Scheler eds. 1955). In this sense, the episode of Judge Brideyz in Le Tiers Livre is
especially significant; in the last analysis, it stands as a lesson in Christian humility.
While men should do their utmost to achieve justice through their own means, they also
should recognize the limitations of their nature and appeal for guidance and have confidence in the divine will that governs all things. See id. at 315, 468-84.
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mental thrust or enveloping it with the flesh that it needs to
sustain its life-in any case, it is not located inside it either explicitly or formally. For example, legal treatises written by natural law scholars set the stage for the first wave of European codifi8
cation in the nineteenth century. Moreover, natural rights
theory imbued the provisions of the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man, the American Declaration of Independence, and
the American Constitution." In other words, the natural law heritage was vital to laying the foundations for the Western democratic tradition.
Serving as a mold for nascent ideologies and systems, the
natural law tradition makes the case for the "oughtness" of law.
Its historical role corroborates the view that it always has endeavored to express man's highest potential. The idealism which
it embodies-its uncompromising insistence upon the imperative
of moral beliefs-never has been called into question by its advocates. The Thomistic distinction between the primary principles
and the subnorms of natural law, 20 and, to a less formal extent,
Plato's realization that his ideal of the philosopher-king was
include
18. These treatises, written in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
Naturel
Puffendorf's De Jure Naturae et Genium (1672), Burlamaqui's Principesdu Droit
In true natural
(1747), and Vattel's Droit des Gens ou Principesde la Loi Nature le (1783).
and justice.
law fashion, these works purported to contain the unalterable rules of reason
of a
foundations
the
lay
to
come
had
time
the
that
monarchs
reigning
They persuaded
see
perfect legal system. For a detailed discussion of the codification movement generally,
(1912).
434-51
HISTORY
LEGAL
CoNTINENTAL
OF
SURVEY
GENERAL
A
VARIOUS AUTHORS,
and
19. The natural rights of man were seen as simple and indisputable principles
and
born
were
men
rights;
inalienable
with
endowed
was
man
every
self-evident truths;
right of the
remain free and equal in rights; finally, these documents proclaimed the
50,
people to abolish repressive forms of government. See A. D'ENTRgVES, supra note 8, at
docu54-59. The natural law influence on the American political tradition is very well
of
mented. The Bill of Rights, the notions of due process of law and the equal protection
law
natural
the
from
derived
are
balances,
the laws, the implicit system of checks and
(1942); P. CONKIN, SELFheritage. See C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ch. 2
RIGHT AND THE "WARREN
NATURAL
LAW,
EVIDENT TRUTHS 120-42 (1974); J. FOLEY, NATURAL
120 (1930). See also
COURT" (1965); C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 52,
Legal
Anglo-American
the
in
Institutions
Juridical
Brown, The Natural Law Basis of
3
System, 4 CATH. U.L. REV. 81 (1954); Corwin, Natural Law and Constitutional Law,
American
the
and
Law
Natural
Desmond,
1949);
ed.
NAT. L. INST. PROC. 47-49 (A. Scanlan
Constitution,22 FORDHAM L. REV. 235 (1953); Gardner, Legal Idealism and Constitutional
30 GEo.
Law, 10 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1964); Lucey, NaturalLaw and American Legal Realism,
NAT.
L.J. 493 (1942); Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of the Founding Fathers, 1
and
Review
Judicial
of
Doctrine
The
McCoy,
1949);
ed.
L. INST. PROC. 3 (A. Scanlan
Natural Law, 6 CATH. U.L. REV. 97 (1956); Sternberg, Natural Law in American
Jurisprudence,13 NOTRE DAME LAW. 89 (1938); Wheeler, The Foundationsof Constitutionalism, 8 Loy. U.L. REV. 507 (1975); Wilkin, Status of Natural Law in American
Jurisprudence, 2 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 125 (A. Scanlan ed. 1949).
20. See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
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inoperative in the daily administration of justice" are isolated
moments of hesitation and doubt in an otherwise unfaltering tradition of optimism about man and humanity in general. For natural law theorists, it seemed quite sufficient to make the claim that
natural law was the purveyor of legitimacy, that its voice was
dispositive on those issues relating to the foundations of human
society, rights, and obligations and to state that the positive law
should conform to the standard that it established.
Any acquaintance with the actual implementation of law,
however, leaves one with the suspicion that the "is" of law, although it still bears a general relationship to the ideal, is somehow distinct from it. The judicial resolution of specific controversies and the practical necessities that dominate the administration of justice often do not refer, of their very nature, to notions
of fundamental Justice and intrinsic Rights. For example, the
desire to promote stable commercial transactions, the fact that
French citizens have the legal prerogative of being sued before
their national courts, and that intercourse with a person under a
certain age will constitute rape are social policy determinations,
not immutable principles of law aiming at or emanating from a
sense of higher law or of man's humanity. The enactment of positive laws and their application transforms the original principle
of absolute legitimacy into a notion of relative legality anchored
in administrative expediency and buttressed by attempts at consistency, fairness, and reasonableness. The human transcription
of fundamental law is riddled with imperfections, making its concrete manifestations but an ersatz of the ideal.
Rather than refuting the existence of an unwritten higher law
or making its principles irrelevant for the formation of legal rules,
the discordance between the ideal statement of law and its actual
implementation speaks to the problem of human existence generally, and, more specifically, to the fate of uncompromising idealism in any human context. It reveals another, often neglected,
face of natural law. Although men may premise their allegiance
to a political and legal system on the ground that it reflects, in
its theoretical form, a perfect merger of their intrinsic beliefs with
the realities of political and legal organization, they are constantly aware or reminded that the external structure does not
measure up to inward beliefs and that the mechanism for transposing the ontology of law is defective. To his great distress, one
thinking about Man, through the prism of his own individuality,
21. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
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unimpeded by any obstacle but the barriers of his own feelings
and mind, inevitably arrives at different conclusions about the
potential of man and the role of law when he ponders the reality
of deciding claims of injustice and injury by one individual
against another.
The idealistic speculation about law began among the ancient Greeks;22 there, the natural law influence perhaps was most
3
apparent in the various schools of Greek philosophy. For example, it is among the Greek stoic philosophers that the term
"natural law" first emerged as an explicit construct of legal
theory. 4 According to the Stoics, man, although powerless to
modify the divine plan governing the universe, was a product of
the transcending order; he possessed an innate sense of right and
wrong with an ability to gain insight into the natural operations
of the universe through his reason. 5 Borrowing from his Greek
predecessors, Cicero 6 integrated these ideas into Roman stoic
22. The idealistic speculation about law was reflected in the Greek concept of political organization, the "polis," and in the thinking of its statesmen and philosophers. The
polis stood as a symbol of the people as a whole and of a unique way of life that was
common to all of them. Moreover, it was the repository of moral and civic values. The
function of law within the polis was to reflect general normative standards capable of
fostering the good life among the members of the community. For a discussion of the Greek
city-state, see H. Krrro, THE GREEKS 64, 68-69, 72, 75, 78, 94 (1957); Le Bel, NaturalLaw
in the Greek Period, 2 NAT. L. INST. PRoc. 3 (A. Scanlan ed. 1949). For a discussion of
Solon's contribution to the Greek civic organization and its natural law influence, see I.
LINFORTH, SOLON THE ATHENIAN 67 (1919); PLUTARCH, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOLON, in GREEK
LITERATURE IN TRANSLATION 400, 403 (M. Grant ed.; I. Scott-Kilvert trans. 1973).
23. Much of the classical philosophic thinking about law came about, at least in part,
as a reaction to the empirical bent of the Sophists who divorced law from all ethical
values and insisted upon its relative character and variability. See M. UNTERSTEINER,
THE SOPHISTS 322-24 (K. Freeman trans. 1954). Later Greek philosophers rejected the
sophistic conception of law and espoused a more idealistic conception of law. Plato, for
example, contended that law had an intrinsic character. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (F.
Cornford trans. 1945), in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 13 (W. Ebenstein ed. 1960). See
generally I. RICHARDS, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (1942); PLATO, THE LAWS (A. Taylor trans.
1960). See also J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 10-17. For an assessment of Aristotle's contribution to juridical thinking and its difference from Platonic speculation, see, e.g., GREAT
POLITICAL THINKERS, supra, at 64-75; J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 18-35.
24. See J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 36. For a detailed discussion of stoic philosophy,
see, e.g., S. STOCK, STOICISM (1969); A. VIRIEUS-REYMOND, POUR CONNAITRE LAPENSEE DES
STOICIENS (1976). Their pantheistic conception of being and their contemplation of nature
led them to envision man as a part of a general humanity, to insist upon man's status as
a being within the cosmic order. See J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 37.
25. See S. STOCK, supra note 24, at 8-9. See also J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 36.
26. For the following analysis of Cicero's thought, the author has relied extensively
upon two principal sources: GREAT POLIrICAL THINKERS, supra note 23, at 121-25 (preface
to Cicero's The Republic and the Laws); J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 38-52. See also Levy,
Natural Law in the Roman Period, 2 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 43, 44-49 (A. Scanlan ed. 1949);
Wilkin, Cicero and the Law of Nature, 1 S.M.U. STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 1, 16-25 (A.
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thought, proclaiming the existence of a superior set of laws in
nature to which all human conduct and conventions should conform. In 533, Justinian incorporated into his law books the fundamental notions of natural law theory, that law was divinely inspired (hence immutable) and that its authoritativeness
stemmed from its intrinsic dignity and reason, not its coercive
character. 2 Eventually, these same principles became part of
church dogma.2 The writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas provide
the most lucid statement of scholastic natural law, of the merger
of its pagan heritage with the imperatives of Christian teaching.2
For Aquinas, the natural law not only was testimony to
man's special place in creation, but also it reflected God-given
30
and therefore objective principles of the universal moral order.
The natural law symbolized, as it were, a common meeting
ground between man and his personal creator, a point of mediation at which the obscurity of existence dissipated and man
gained insight into the meaning of the divinely-ordained cosmos. 3 ' Positive human laws could not lay claim to a status of
legitimacy unless their substance coincided with the fixed and
unchanging principles of the natural law.3 2 Moreover, Aquinas
achieved a remarkable reconciliation of the transcending and
practical order of existence by limiting the invariability of the
Harding ed. 1954). According to Cicero, human laws were valid only to the extent that
they conformed to the values and principles that were predetermined by the universal
order and embodied in the natural law. See CIcERo, THE REPUBLIC AND Tm LAws (C. Keyes
trans. 1928), in GaEAT POLITCAL THINKERS, supra note 23, at 125.

27. See A.

D'ENTRVES,

supra note 8, at 18. See generally J.

HADLEY, INTRODUCTION

(1876).
28. The attainment of human felicity no longer was relegated to the afterlife, as the
proponents of Augustinian pessimism had maintained, but rather the City of God at least
could be realized partially during man's terrestrial existence. See A. D'ENTRvES, supra
note 8, at 33-38.
29. For a discussion of the theological implications of the doctrine of natural law, see,
e.g., J. FUCHS, NATURAL LAw-A THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION (H. Reckter & J. Dowling
trans. 1965). For a discussion of natural law concepts during the Middle Ages generally,
see, e.g., Gerould, Medieval Conceptions of Natural Law, 2 NAT. L. INST. PRoc. 73 (A.
Scanlan ed. 1949). For a detailed consideration of St. Thomas Aquinas's work as it relates
to natural law, see THE NATURAL LAw READER, supra note 7, at 27, 68-90; A. D'ENTREVES,
supra note 8, at 39-45; Davitt, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law, 1 S.M.U.
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 26 (A. Harding ed. 1954).
TO ROMAN LAw

30. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II, question 94, arts. 1-4, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WaSrERN WORLD 220-24 (1952); see A. D'ENTREVE, supra note 8, at 39.
31. T. AQUINAS, supra note 30, question 94, arts. 1-3, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 220-23 (1952); see THE NATURAL LAw READER, supra note 7, at 158-59.
32. T. AQUINAS, supra note 30, question 95, arts. 1-2, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD

226-28 (1952).
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principles" and allowing for fluctuanatural law to its "primary
' 33
"subnorms.
its
in
tions

IV.

THE MODERN STATEMENT OF NATURAL LAW THEORY

The influence of Thomistic thinking and scholasticism generally abated with the emergence of nation-states headed by powerful monarchs and with the increasing divisiveness in religious
ideas. The benevolent union of God's will and man's reason in a
meaningful universal and natural pattern was challenged by the
unbending severity of protestant dogma and became untenable in
light of the aspirations of reigning monarchs. The elaboration of
a theory justifying the absolute temporal power of kings on the
basis of their divine right to rule, the product of these new preoccupations, eventually engendered a reassessment of some of the
fundamental assumptions of natural law theory.
In its implications upon law, the divine right theory held that
the proper content of law could be ascertained only through the
intermediary of an anointed temporal sovereign. The king, God's
immediate representative within the nation-state, was the sole
author of law, the judge of what was just and unjust: "Only he is
absolutely sovereign who, after God, acknowledges no one greater
than himself. ' 34 Through this theoretical schema, the sovereign
monarchs gained independence from papal authority and retained a solid theological basis for the exercise of their power.
Among the apologists for political absolutism, Hobbes perhaps
was the most brilliant advocate of the command theory of law-in
any event, the chief and most articulate spokesman for man's
wanton depravity. In his view, man's domination by his natural
passions led to his sequestration from fundamental values, relegated him to the pursuit of his enlightened self-interest and, finally, necessitated a rule of law based upon the fear of force.
Hobbes was one of the first political theorists to refer to a
hypothetical state of nature and to make use of the concept of a
social contract. According to Hobbesian vision, the physical and
intellectual equality of men in the state of nature resulted in a
condition of perpetual war in which the "continual fear and danger of violent death" 35 not only rendered civilized life impossible,
33. T.

supra note 30, question 94, arts. 2, 4, 5, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
221-25 (1952).

AQUINAS,

WESTERN WORLD

34. J. BODIN, Six BOOKS ON THE STATE
THINKERS, supra note 23, at 349, 350.
35. T.

(W.

Ebenstein trans.

HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS,

1960),

in GREAT POLITICAL

supra note 23, at 366, 368.
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but also actually made "the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short."3 To assuage their fear of death, men agreed
to enter into the social contract and to establish a legal and political structure which would guarantee their peace and security.
Although not a party to the contract, the sovereign was its creation and his command became law; his will was valid law so long
as it remained an effective instrument of stability-its reliance on
the "fear of punishment ' 3 notwithstanding:
The only way to erect ... a common power, as may be able to
defend . . . [men] from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as
that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they
may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all
their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly
of men. . . . And in him consists the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great
multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made
themselves everyone the author, to the end he may use the
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for
their peace and common defence.3
The Hobbesian will theory of law excluded any fundamental
interpenetration between the substance of the civil laws and the
values embodied in the natural laws. The relative insignificance
of the general "moral virtues"3 within civil society stemmed from
the fact that the natural law lacked any coercive character and
bore no necessary relation to the will of the sovereign. After postulating the supremacy of the commands of the sovereign, it was
impossible for Hobbes to conceive of an illegal law within the
framework of civil society, especially when the criteria for determining what was just and unjust emanated from a higher law
founded upon natural reason or divine revelation. 0 Both legality
and legitimacy were functions of sovereignty buttressed by force
and necessity, not conviction:
[I]t is manifest that law in general is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any man, but only of him
whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey
him."
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371-72.
GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS, supra note 23, at 362.

Id.
See T. HOSBES, supra note 35, at 379.
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[T]he laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy,
and, in sum, doing to others, as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be
observed, are contrary to our natural passions that carry us to
partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without
the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at
all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature (which
everyone has then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when
he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great
enough for our security, every man will, and may, lawfully rely
2
on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.
The Hobbesian reduction of law to its principal systemic
characteristics, his divesting it of any dependence upon an external normative standard, did not go long unchallenged. His theory
of sovereignty, his use of the notion of a state of nature and of the
concept of a social contract, however, had made significant inroads into legal and political thinking and had created a considerable distance between matters political and considerations of
divinely ordained truth. Hobbes and the movement he represented had not proclaimed the demise of natural law, but had
prepared the ground for the modification of its classical thrust.
Opposed to the voluntarist theory of law, to the base subservience
to absolute political authority it implied, and to the puritanical
overtones of its conception of the lot of ordinary man, the new
school of natural law, led by Hugo Grotius, attempted to integrate the tenets of the doctrine into an exclusively secular, ratiohalistic context. Their work, although reinstating normative ethical considerations into the determination of legality, set the stage
for the transformation of natural law theory from a system of
divinely proclaimed obligations and duties to a statement of inalienable individual rights. 3
Despite the reassertion of the ethical foundations of law and
of its concordance with transcendent values, albeit on purely ra42. Id. at 371. See generally F.

WINDOLPH, LEVIATHAN AND NATURAL LAW

(1951).

43. See generally Leclercq, Suggestions for Clarifying Natural Law, 2 NAT. L.F. 64

(1957). Grotius reversed the Hobbesian assumption about the state of nature and the
purpose and motivation of the social contract: a natural inclination to benevolence
brought men to create civil society. See R. DERATHE, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ET LA SCIENCE
POLITIQUE DE SON TEMPS 41-42 (1970). Grotius's chief contribution to natural law thinking
rests in his methodology and in the secular assumptions underlying that methodology. In
De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Grotius set out to prove that it was possible to establish a
system of laws which were free from theological speculations. See, e.g., A. D'ENTREVES,
supra note 8, at 51-53. Man's solitary reason could determine what was immutably right
and wrong. Natural law precepts were inherently rational-self-evident truths which
flowed from the very nature of things. See J. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 88.
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tionalistic grounds, the work of philosophers such as Grotius still
was seen principally as a justification for absolute royal
power-its secular orientation allowing kings to proclaim their
autonomy vis-a-vis papal authority." The response to the
Hobbesian vision of the origins of political and legal obligations
came from Locke. His Two Treatises of Government, published
in 1690,11 provided the theoretical substance by which natural law
thinking ceased to serve the interests of all-powerful monarchs
and became a cornerstone for the preservation of individual rights
against the encroachments of arbitrary institutional power.
For Locke, the rule of law actually preceded rather than
stemmed from the creation of civil society. In his description of
the state of nature, men did not selfishly pursue their natural
rights to the detriment of others;4" on the contrary, they lived
in natural and reasonable mutual accord-their natural rights to
liberty and equality being exercised within the framework of reciprocal obligations and privileges provided by the natural laws:
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in,
and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and
dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another. ...
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of
license. . . The state of nature has a law of nature to govern
it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions. . there cannot be supposed any
such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy
one another.'7
The purpose of establishing a civil society was to perfect the
natural schema, to remedy its deficiencies, not to contrive an
artificial civil construct which would undo the fundamental natural principles of the human community. According to Locke, the
44. See R. DERATHE, supra note 43, at 45.
45. J. LoCKE, Two TREATisEs OF GOVERNMENT, in GREAT PoLmcAL THINKERS, supra
note 23, at 393.
46. Id. at 393-94.
47. Id.
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natural legal order evidenced a number of drawbacks:
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of
right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them ...
Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences
according to the established law . ..
Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to
the sentence when right, and to give it due
back and 4support
8
execution.

Civil society provided the impartial institutional framework in
which the laws of nature could be transcribed and9 enforced without "the inconveniences of the state of nature." By consenting
to the social contract, the men of nature acquiesced to an infringement upon their natural independence in order to safeguard, more precisely, to acquire the secure exercise of, their more
basic natural rights:
[T]he obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but
only in many cases are drawn closer, and have, by human laws,
known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation.
Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men,
legislators as well as others.w
Like Hobbes, Locke asserted that the social contract was
done between the individual members of the nascent civil society;
whereas for Hobbes sovereignty came in the aftermath of the
agreement, for Locke the contractants established only a form of
limited government. The people delegated law making authority
in the form of a trust to the legislature, which reigned supreme
among the organs of government. The people, however, were both
the author and beneficiary of the trust, i.e., they retained ultimate possession and the enjoyment of their rights; the legislature
was no more than a trustee, an agent of the people entrusted with
limited obligations, i.e., to execute the duties imposed upon it by
the people." Whenever the government violated its responsibilities under the trust, Locke maintained that the people had the
right to dissolve it and establish a new government:
48. Id. at 405.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 398.
51. See GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS, supra note 23, at 387-88 (preface to Locke's Two
Treatises of Government).
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[Wihenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy
the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under
arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the
people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther [sic] obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society . . . by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the
people had put into their hands . . . and it devolves to the
people; who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by
the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think
fit), provide for their own safety and security, which is the end
5
for which they are in society.

The political writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau" are part of
the movement which transformed natural law doctrine into a
theory of natural rights; they take their place at a point which
perhaps is equidistant between Hobbes's absolutism and Locke's
liberalism." 4 Like his predecessors, Rousseau is interested in arriving at an understanding of the foundations of legal and political obligations; he, too, elaborates a State theory by referring to
a hypothetical state of nature and the concept of a social contract.
His originality, 55 however, does not stem exclusively from his defi52. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS, supra
note 23, at 409. In the eyes of posterity, Grotius was the "father of natural law"; Locke,
however, clearly had rescued it from any subservience to absolutism. See, e.g., Leclercq,
supra note 43, at 69. In the modem reformulation of the doctrine, Locke was the chief
guardian and advocate of its explicit teaching. For a discussion of the more moderate
views of Grotius's followers, see R. DERATHE, supra note 43, at 44-45, 79, 87-93.
53. J.-J. ROUSSEAU, OEUVRES COMPLaTES (ed. Integrale) (M. Launay ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as OEUVRES COMPL9TES]. The author assumes all responsibility for the
translations of the original French text. Useful secondary works on Rousseau include: R.
DERATHE, supra note 43; M. LAUNAY, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ]CRIVAIN POLITIQUE (1971);
J. STAROBINSKI, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, LA TRANSPARENCE ET L'OBSTACLE (1957). See also
Althusser, Sur le Contrat Social, 8 CAHIERS POUR L'ANALYSE 5 (1967); Hochart, Droits
Naturel et Simulaire, 8 CAHIERS POUR L'ANALYSE 65 (1967).
54. According to Professor Ebenstein,
Rousseau's conception of sovereignty differs from both Hobbes' and
Locke's. In Hobbes' the people set up a sovereign and transfer all power to him.
In Locke's social contract the people set up a limited government for limited
purposes, but Locke shuns the conception of sovereignty-popular or monarchical-as a symbol of political absolutism. Rousseau's sovereign is the people,
constituted as a political community through the social contract.
GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS, supra note 23, at 437 (preface to Rousseau's The Social
Contract). Professor Ebenstein then adds that "[ujnlike all other major political thinkers, Rousseau considers the sovereignty of the people inalienableand indivisible."Accord,
R. DERATHE, supra note 43, at 104-11, 116-19.
55. In retracing the influence of previous political theorists upon Rousseau, Professor
Derathe asserts that Johannes Althusius, who published a work entitled Politica Method-
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nition of political legitimacy in terms of the sovereignty of the
people."6 Rousseau's most important contribution to natural law
thinking lies in the shift of focus he introduces into the classical
political discourse. His literary sensitivity is ever-present in his
political writings and enables him to pose the problem of merging
the ideal and the real in its starkest terms. Rousseau's political
writings are not merely a representative sample of the more modern natural law theory; they, in fact, engender a reassessment of
the ultimate significance of the entire natural law tradition by
demonstrating, implicitly but unequivocally, that utopian speculations, although they originate in optimistic and idealistic convictions, contain a message and teach man about the metaphysical dilemma of human existence.

V.

RoussEAu's LITERARY DISPOSITION

The consideration of Rousseau's status as a literary writer 5is7
indispensable to the proper assessment of his political theory.
He, like other creators of fiction, laid claim to a special sensitivity ("[T]he first of my needs, the greatest, the strongest, the
most inextinguishable, was. . . the need for an intimate relationship and as intimate as possible"),5 which not only accounts for
his originality, but also allowed him to assert, as do other artisits,
that his fictional constructs could capture the true and vital essence of things. The Confessions,5 9 for example, is an attempt to
abolish the distance which Rousseau perceives between himself
and others. 0 Despite his feeling of estrangement, Rousseau was
convinced that a state of perfect happiness could be attained,
that he could establish a personal intimacy between himself and
the outside world without suffering any infringement of his individuality. The reconsideration of the past, however, inevitably
entailed a good deal of interpretation and restructuring. The
Confessions became a story of what could and should have
been-an embellished but distorted textual reality, in effect, a
ice Digesta in 1603, some 150 years before The Social Contract, actually elaborated a
theory of popular sovereignty that was very close to the one Rousseau advanced. See R.
DERATHE, supra note 43, at 94-99.
56. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
57. For a list of works on the subject of Rousseau's autobiographical and political
writings, see note 53 supra.
58. J.-J. RoussEAU, Confessions, in 1 OEUVRES COMPLitES, supra note 53, at 120, 281.
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 120-21.

19791

Natural Law Theory

refuge from the hostility and incomprehension of the outside
world.6 The world of the Confessions, then, harbored and nurtured Rousseau's craving for utopian felicity, allowing him, as it
were, to authenticate his purported self-knowledge and to inveigh
against the hostile world-to show that he did not share its imperfections and to state with absolute conviction that his life was
the symbol of an exemplary morality:
I feel my heart and I know men. I am not made like any that I
have seen; I dare believe that I am not made like any that exist.
If I am not better, at least I am different. .... 62
This conviction not only is at the very heart of Rousseau's
dilemma, but also is the key to understanding his autobiographical enterprise and his earlier political writings. Rousseau
believed steadfastly that he was a unique being-the only man
to have escaped, albeit through fortuitous circumstances, the corruption of social institutions and to have remained a natural man
capable of genuine virtue. His life epitomized an unabating adherence to absolute truth and morality. Blame for the incompatibility, therefore, could not be laid upon his shoulders; the conflict
had arisen because the others, in their moral degeneration, were
unable to understand Rousseau's natural simplicity and honesty.
Moreover, by giving them an example of their possible natural
moral perfection, Rousseau actually was rendering a service to his
fellow man. Finally, Rousseau's moral sixth sense, his "open and
frank nature, 6 3 the transparency of his heart and feelings," and
the detail of his narrative 5 guaranteed the veracity and objectivity of his account.
What Rousseau attempted to accomplish in his autobiographical writings also had been his task in his political works,
despite the fact that he addressed himself to a different level of
human experience. The Confessions stands as an effort to trans61. Id. at 285.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. at 293.
65. Id. at 187. When the mission of the Confessions failed, Rousseau retreated to a
less tendentious autobiographical mode, while still preserving the hope that his message
of truth would reach his mistaken brothers. See J.-J. RoUSSEAu, Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire, in id. at 501, 503. Resigning himself to his fate but adamant in the belief
that he would be vindicated someday, Rousseau decided to cultivate the experience of his
own being for himself. See id. at 504, 523, 606. But even the promise of the literary vehicle
proved unsatisfactory-its salutary experience being only temporary. Rousseau came to
realize that his desire for utopian felicity could not be incorporated into or satisfied by
reality.
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form Rousseau's sense of his individuality into the collective consciousness of mankind. In that work, Rousseau states that any
reconciliation will take place on his own terms: the others are
obliged to acknowledge the superiority of his individuality and to
have their personal identity mirror and become inseparable from
his. When he realizes that his efforts have failed, his intransigence becomes absolute. In the eighth Promenade, Rousseau declares:
In whichever way men choose to see me, they would be unable
to change my being, and despite their power and despite all
their hidden intrigues, I will continue whatever they might do
to be in spite of them what I am. 66
In the political writings, the tension again centers upon Rousseau's conception of the individual, of his natural liberty and
independence, and of the constraints imposed upon them by a
necessary but external collective body. The notion of the general
will, which represents Rousseau's way of resolving the tension, is
nothing other than a synonym for his autobiographical perception
of the universality and righteousness of his being.
VI.

THE DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY

In this early work, Rousseau sets out to prove that men living
in society have become alien to their own nature, that the moral
principles which should govern men's behavior are inoperative
within the social framework. Rousseau's concept of the history of
mankind, built around a notion of natural morality and Rousseau's own sense of his humanity, consists of three principal
phases: from an original primitive and solitary state, man becomes organized into groups; with the institution of property and
law, man emerges from the presocial phase of his evolution and
becomes a social being. 7
In the original state of nature, historical time was absent:
men lived in the absolute stability of a nonhistory-their behavior was largely instinctive, limited to their immediate needs, and
their basic makeup remained unchanged for centuries:
But without referring to the uncertain evidence of history, who
does not see that everything appeared to distance primitive man
from the temptation and the means of ceasing to be
66. Id. at 535-36.
67. J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Discours Sur 'Origine et les Fondements de llnegalite Parmi
les Hommes, in 2 0EUVRES COMPLETES, supra note 53, at 204.
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[primitive]? His imagination embellished nothing; his heart
asked nothing of him. His slight needs were . . .[easily satisfied], and he is so far from the degree of knowledge necessary
to want to acquire more knowledge, that he could neither foresee
nor be curious. The spectacle of nature becomes indifferent to
him . . . it is always the same order, it is always the same
revolutions; he is not sufficiently mindful to be surprised by the
greatest marvels . . . His soul, which nothing disturbs, gives
itself to the only feeling of its present existence without any idea
of the future, however close it may be; and his plans, as limited
as his perspective, hardly extend to the end of the day. "'
Unlike other animals, however, human beings could feel pity and
possessed a latent capacity to perfect themselves"-given the
right circumstances, they could sharpen the use of their reason
and leave the rudimentary state of existence:
It is then very certain that pity is a natural feeling. . . .It
is . . . [the feeling] which brings us without thinking to help
others that we see suffering; it is . . .[the feeling] which, in
the state of nature, replaces the laws, the mores and virtue, with
this advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle
voice. ...
• . .[T]he perfectibility, the social virtues, and the other
faculties . . . natural man had received [them] only potentially, and they could not develop themselves unaided .... 70
Geophysical revolutions finally ended the period of' nonhistory; population growth, the division of the earth into continents, and the scarcity of food forced men to form families.
Within the family, man began to acquire an understanding of
property, slowly coming to envisage its possession as vital to his
well-being. As families united into clans and grew into nations,
men became industrious; the possession of property was buttressed by social preferences and public reputation. According to
Rousseau, mankind was on the verge of giving primacy to its
passions, of forever renouncing the possibility of true happiness.
Men were ready to abandon amour de soi, this "natural sentiment which induces all animals to be attentive to their own preservation and which . . . engenders humanity and virtue, ' ' 71 for
amour-propre, which
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.at 219.
Id.at 224, 227.

Id.
Id. at 223.
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is but a relative, artificial sentiment, born in society, which
induces each individual to place more importance upon himself
than anyone else, which inspires men to commit all the wrongs
that they do to one another, and which is the true source of
honor."
When men discovered the products of the earth, they extinguished all hope of ever realizing their moral potential. The technological advances which permitted the harvesting of wheat and
the mining of iron required a division of labor which brought an
end to the original independence and liberty. The physical inequality of men, which had no significance in the solitary state of
nature, became the very foundation of the evolving human community:
Let us conclude that roving in the forests, without any occupation, without speech, without a home, without war and without relationships, without any need for his fellows as without
any desire to prejudice them, perhaps without having ever recognized anyone of them individually, primitive man, subject to
few passions, and sufficing to himself, had only the feelings and
intelligence which were proper to this state. ...
[Having described it in detail, I wanted] to show, in the
portrait of the true state of nature, how inequality, even natural
state as much reality
[inequality], is far from having in this
73
and influence as our writers pretend.
Without any system of organized constraints, however, property
was distributed according to the rule of the stronger: mankind
was in a perpetual state of war. In order to preserve their wealth,
the strong duped the weak and poor into establishing civil society
and, thereby, consecrated the principle of physical and economic
inequality among men. As social beings living in a state of inequality, men lost all traces of their original potential for moral
development. Dominance and servitude had severed any link between social man and natural pity, freedom, and independence:
Such was or must have been the origin of society and of the
laws which gave the weak new impediments and the rich new
force, destroyed forever the natural liberty, established forever
the law of property and of inequality, of an adroit usurpation
made an irrevocable right, and, for the benefit of a few ambion the entire human
tious [men], subjugated from that point
74
race in work, servitude and misery.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 226.

74. Id. at 234.
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"History," for Rousseau, then consists in the gradual subjugation of nature and of man by the forces of time and culture.
Historical time is a measure of man's moral deterioration, the
destruction of his natural heritage. At a purely textual level,
Rousseau's hypothetical accounts of the state of nature and history are designed to substantiate his initial statement about
man's moral depravity in contemporary society. His historical
inquiry is really a basis for moral commentary: as a social being,
man no longer possesses accurate self-knowledge-his sense of
genuine humanity no longer guides his reason and, in fact, has
been lost in the labyrinth of his passions.75
This account of man's historical progression to a social state,
however, locks him into a prison of despair, placing his natural
birthright beyond his grasp. Civil society is the inevitable product
of History; man cannot break the barriers of time and regain his
natural state. Rousseau has established a sequence of irreversible
events which condemn man to exercise his potential for moral
development within the totally alienating confines of civil society. Despite its presence throughout the text, the antagonism
between the state of nature and society is not as clear-cut as it
appears. After all, the state of nature was not the beatitude of
mankind; in his primitive existence, man was not much more
than an animal-his humanity being a latent but dormant possibility. The crucial problem lies in the process of mediation by
which the natural and artificial are brought together. Rousseau
does not restrict himself to decrying the tragedy of man's inevitable social corruption; rather he leaves his reader with the perplexing question of why civil society failed to accommodate man's
moral potential and bring it to its culmination. In his subsequent
political writings, Rousseau attempts to provide a solution that
will redress the evolution of mankind. Believing that his authentic natural humanity and his exemplary individuality will provide him with sufficient inspiration and, most importantly, with
the truth, he attempts to bridge the gap between the individual's
75. The historical fable is a textual transcription of the vital aspects of Rousseau's
personality and his own personal dilemma. Even as a political thinker, Rousseau is struggling with his feeling of social incompatibility and attempting to reconcile it with his
conviction that he is right and the others wrong. In the Discourse, Rousseau assumes the
role of the self-appointed spokesman of Nature; his work is to be seen as an impartial, if
not an altruistic, defense of an unsoiled humanity, of which Rousseau is the sole representative, against the belligerent incomprehension of a corrupt society. In this way, Rousseau
establishes the authenticity of his deeply felt beliefs and finds fault with the outside world.
See id. at 212.
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natural freedom and independence and the historical necessity of
imposing a legal and political order.
VII.

THE ARTICLE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

Rousseau's Discourse on Political Economy is a necessary
epilogue to the historical pessimism of the Discourse on Inequality and also functions as a preface to the State theory elaborated
in The Social Contract. In this writing, Rousseau again acts as
the spokesman for the inalienable rights of man and of his moral
nature; this time, however, his purpose is to formulate a theory
of the legitimate State. He takes violent exception to previous
theories justifying political absolutism, contending that they portray humanity as it has been perverted by amour-propre.According to Rousseau, the legitimate political State must be founded
upon the consent and for the good of all its members. In a word,
it must offer man the possibility of redressing the course of history
and allow him to develop his moral potential.
Prior to Rousseau, Bossuet" and Filmer78 had argued for absolute royal power on the basis of the divine right theory. Using
an analogy between the State and the family, they equated royal
power with the paternal authority ordained by God. As mentioned previously,7" Hobbes was one of the most brilliant representatives of the absolutist tradition. Rather than rely explicitly
upon a theological vision of man and history, he maintained that
civil society was founded upon the basis of a social contract in
which the individual contractants surrender all their rights to an
absolute master. Despite this total alienation, the civil society
was legitimate since it had been founded upon a voluntary basis:
men preferred the security of an absolute regime to the anarchy
of a state of perpetual war. 0
For Rousseau, absolute royal power is the very antithesis of
the legitimate State. In his view, no amount of theological speculation can justify an infringement upon man's most sacred attributes as a human being-nor can it condone the coercive abandonment of man's inalienable natural rights. The State exists for the
benefit of its members, not its rulers; rights can be surrendered
76. J.-J. RoussE~u, Discours Sur I'Economie Politique, in 2 OEUVRES COMPLETES,
supra note 53, at 276.
77. J.-B. BOsSUET, POLITIQuE TrES DES PROPRES PAROLES DE L'EcRrrURE SAINTE (J. Le
Brun ed. 1967).
78. See J.-J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 76.
79. See text accompanying notes 36-47 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
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only voluntarily and solely for the good of the individuals involved. More specifically, Rousseau finds that the makeup of the
family differs markedly from the organization of the State on a
number of important grounds, especially in respect to the foundation and purpose of political power and paternal authority:
But how can the government of the State be similar to that
of the family the foundations of which are so different? The
father being physically stronger than his children for as long as
his aid is necessary to them, paternal authority is rightly conceived of as being established by nature. In the great family of
which all the members are naturally equal; political authority,
purely arbitrary as to its institution, can be founded only upon
conventions, nor [can] the magistrate command others except
in virtue of the laws. . . . The duties of the father are dictated
to him by natural feelings. . . . [Political] leaders have no
similar rules, and are only obliged to the people by what they
have promised to do .... "
In Rousseau's estimation, conferring the same wide-ranging
power upon government officials as nature has bestowed upon the
father of the family would be tantamount to inviting tyranny
within the civil structure: the leaders' pursuit of their personal
interests would constantly undermine the operation of the laws
and the integrity of the public interest. Having no bonds of reciprocal natural affection and devotion to hold it together, the social
framework would degenerate into a chaos of arbitrary abuse:
Although the functions of the father of the family and of the
first magistrate should aim at the same end, it is by means so
different [from one another], their duties and their rights are
so distinct, that we cannot confuse them without arriving at a
false idea of the fundamental laws of society, and without falling
into errors which would be fatal to mankind.2
Having challenged the foundations of the divine right theory,
Rousseau then considers the Hobbesian dichotomy between
man's right to liberty and the need for order, recognizing it as the
most difficult problem of classical political theory but with a view
to reconciling the tension by elaborating a novel concept of the
role of law within political society. Rousseau separates the various types of States into two categories according to the function
of law in their internal organization. In the illegitimate State,
81. See J.-J. RoussEu, supra note 76.
82. Id. at 277.
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the law consists in the command of a ruler; the laws are not really
laws at all, but only a political mechanism for subjugating men
to arbitrary rule. Whereas in the legitimate State, the law is the
expression of the public interest and of the vital principle of the
State; the laws are truly laws in that they have an equally salutary effect upon the individual members of the body politic and
the political community as a whole. Theorists who have attempted to justify the State in its illegitimate form have been
content to observe the moral perversion of man and have been
unwilling to recognize the potentially dynamic character of the
historical process-the possibility of rectifying the imbalance between natural morality and acquired culture. The principles of
the legitimate State are the offsprings of the unity of human
reason and transcending morality; they are the particular concern
of those theorists who are sufficiently enlightened to recognize the
ravaging of humanity by the force of amour-propreand who wish
to put an end to its work.
In the state of nature, men complied with the natural imperatives instinctively and of necessity. As social beings, having
reached a point in their evolution in which they can exercise their
moral potential, men can tolerate only those constraints which
lead them to moral virtue. A form of civil servitude, therefore, is
as unsatisfactory as it is unacceptable; the tension between liberty and order is to be resolved by creating a legal and political
regime which guarantees stability and safeguards the most precious heritage of man: his moral perfectibility. If they are to lay
claim to a status of legitimacy, the laws must fulfill the task of
mediating between the intrinsic and historical features of man's
nature."3
Although Rousseau vehemently rejects the view of the State
structure as the apotheosis of order, he sees the imposition of
constraints for the sake of prompting man's moral development
as vital to, indeed as the sole raisond'etre for, civil society. Laws
exist to make men virtuous and to foster a love for moral virtue
among men, to redress the course of history, to arrive at an appropriate accommodation between man's moral heritage and his
evolved state:
83. Not only has Rousseau framed his statement of the classical political problem in
terms of the traditional verities of natural law doctrine, but he has also managed to orient
the debate along the lines of principles and concepts which are at the very core of his
personality and thinking. Rousseau's definition of the legitimate political order emerges
from a conceptual construct in which he occupies the central role, in which the notion of
legitimacy itself gains its substance from his self-knowledge.
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By what inconceivable art have we been able to find the means
of subjugating men to make them free;. . . to enchain their will
by their own declaration; to make their consent prevail against
their refusal, and to oblige them to punish themselves when they
do what they did not want? . . . These prodigious [things] are
the work of the law. It is to law alone that men owe justice and
liberty. It is this salutary organ of the will of all, which re-4
establishes in the rules of law the natural equality among men.1
The laws are not simply coercive instruments, but the vehicles of
unity and harmony within the body politic-a means of infusing
ideal aspirations into the positive organization of humanity. For
Rousseau, the laws to be cherished, not feared;"5 the function of the government is to establish an intimacy between the
people, the laws, and the civic principles which they embody:
The power of the laws depends much more upon their own
wisdom than the severity of their ministers, and the public
draws its greatest weight from the reason which dictated
it. . . . In effect, the first law is to respect the law: the rigor of
punishments is but a vain resource imagined by small minds to
substitute terror for this respect they cannot obtain.
But when the citizens love their duty, and when the depositories of the public authority make a sincere effort to nourish
this love by their example and by their care, all difficulties
vanish 88
According to Rousseau's theoretical schema, the creation of
the general will and the establishment of the body politic and its
functions are the two principal stages leading up to the institution of the political order. With some rather significant reservations, Rousseau analogizes the operation of the body politic to the
workings of the human body, conceiving it as an organic unity
which functions in harmony with its vital principle, the general
will:
Permit me to use for a moment a common comparison
[which] is imprecise in many respects, but [which] is suitable
to make myself better understood.
The body politic, taken individually, can be considered as
an organized, living body, similar to that of man. The sovereign
power represents the head; the laws and the customs are the
brain, principal of the nerves and [the] seat of understanding,
84. J.-J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 76, at 280.
85. Id. at 280, 282.
86. Id.
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of the will and the senses, of which the judges and magistrates
are the organs; . . . the citizens are the body and the limbs

which make the machine move, live and work ....
The life of one and the other is the common self to the
whole, the reciprocal sensitivity, and the internal concordance
of all the parts ...
The body politic is therefore a moral being who has a will,
and this general will, which always tends toward the preservation and well-being of the whole and of each part, and which is
the source of laws, is for all the members of the State, in relation
between them and it, the rule of the just and unjust .... "I
Through his consent to the social compact, the individual
fuses his will with the will of all the other contractants to form
the general will, the vital principle of the political order which
impregnates the entire body politic-the laws are its expression,
the government, its instrument of implementation. The concept
of the general will is Rousseau's answer to the historical despair
of the Discourse on Inequality. It allows him to reintegrate the
principles of natural morality into History by establishing the
outlines of a State structure which accounts for the totality of
human nature-both in its moral and cultural dimensions. Although the general will certainly conforms to an egalitarian
ideal-it imposes the same obligations upon all the members of
the political community-its concordance with democratic principles is more questionable. Rousseau's theory does not appear
to admit of any form of individual dissent or deviation from the
natural and now the civic moral ideal; it even seems to give the
government the right to regulate and to mold the very minds, to
penetrate into the innermost convictions, of the individual citizen. The promotion of moral conduct seems to abolish completely
any claim the individual might have to a liberty interest.
Within Rousseau's State structure, the government, in
addition to its duty of administering the laws and pursuing a
moderate fiscal policy, has the obligation of providing the citizens
with civic education, of inculcating a sense of State values into
their hearts and minds, making them aware that the salvation of
all rests with the obedience of each individual to these cardinal
precepts:
It is not enough to tell the citizens, be good; we must teach
them to be [good]: and example itself, which is in this respect
the first lesson, is not the sole means that is to be used: the love
87. Id. at 278.
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of the fatherland is the most efficacious; because, as I have
already said, each man is virtuous when his individual will conforms in every aspect to the general will, and [when] we want
88
voluntarily what the people who love us want.
According to Rousseau, this education is necessary to ward off
corruption and abuse, to prevent the political order from degenerating into a form of arbitrary tyranny:
[W]hen . . . all the individual interests are united against the

general interest which is no longer than of anyone, the public
vices have more force to upset the laws, than the laws have to
suppress the vices; and the corruption of the people and the
leaders spreads finally to the government, however wise it may
be; the worst possible abuse is to obey the laws only in appearance only to violate them in effect in security; soon the best laws
become the most fatal; it would be a hundred times better if
they did not exist ....
It is then that for the voice of duty which no longer speaks
in the hearts, that the leaders are obliged to substitute the cry
of terror. "9
Although the civic instruction might be necessary to maintain the
ideology of the State intact, its repressive overtones reveal the
rather fragile balance in the Rousseauian political order between
the omnipotence of the general will within the State structure and
its democratic, establishment. Once man is a citizen in a legitimate State, Rousseau no longer appears to have any confidence
in man's intrinsic moral nature. The moral development of the
individual appears to imply the loss of his liberty, his chief natural moral right; the ideal political order appears to have been
transformed into a form of benevolent dictatorship. While nature
had invested man with a capacity for moral perfection, the fortuitous events of History had left him with a propensity for corruption.
The apparent failure of the political quest, however, should
not cast doubt upon Rousseau's sincerity as an advocate of universal human felicity. Even within the confines of his conceptual
system, Rousseau was trying to achieve the impossible, i.e., to
reconcile fully the contradistinctive exigencies of a natural morality and those of an acquired artificial culture. For Rousseau, man,
evolved as a social being, no longer could choose what was intrinsic to his nature without the support of a moral political order.
88. Id. at 282.
89. Id.
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Rousseau's goal was to bring men to an awareness and understanding of their moral nature despite their inclination to corruption. The Social Contractrepresents the culmination of his efforts
at construcing a legitimate political order for mankind."
VIII.

THE STATE THEORY IN

The Social Contract

In the writings which precede his major political work, Rousseau clearly has established that man, in the present state of
society, is an empty moral being. His moral perfectibility, inherited from nature and which, according to Rousseau, is the distinctive, if not the quintessential, quality of man's humanity, is
but a dim remembrance of the past, an imperceptible shadow in
the darkness of nonhistory. Looking towards the horizon of the
future, man sees only the possibility of civil servitude. In The
Social Contract, Rousseau sets out to devise a State theory
which will redress the historical evolution of mankind and rectify
the imbalance between man's natural and acquired attributes.
The final task of Rousseau's political thinking is to integrate some
measure of the primitive liberty and equality of man into his
increasingly sophisticated cultural evolution:
Man is born free [of artificial constraints], and everywhere
[in society] he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of
others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this
change come about? I do not know. What can make it
legitimate? I think I can answer that question. 9'
For Rousseau, the legitimacy of the political order does not
90. Although the thrust of Rousseau's political teaching is aimed at establishing the
brotherhood of mankind, fostering the love of moral virtue among men, and advocating
the goodness of humanity, it suffers from Rousseau's uncompromising belief in his own
righteousness and from his unbending conviction that the salvation of other men rests
upon their compliance with the intransigent demands of his personality. All of Rousseau's
creativity is dedicated to the utopian reconstruction of existence, to constructing moments
in which a feeling of harmony and conciliation dominates existence, in which the quintessential moments of being also become its ordinary moments. As Rousseau progressively
realizes, even the literary medium, over which he exercises complete control, is incapable
of fully sustaining the energy of such an ambition: the momentary serenity and plenitude
that it provides dissipate and extinguish themselves in the very imperfections of the
language in which it is conceived. The artist, no matter how imaginative, cannot infuse
the breath of real life into his dream: he is a creator, but one relegated to human, not
godly, devices and accomplishments. Rousseau's political speculations do not escape this
predicament. It appears that the perfect sublimation of the will of each citizen in the
vital principle of the State structure, although it establishes a moral order, is inconsistent
with democratic ideas and the notion of individuality itself.
91. J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire, in 1 OEUVRES COMPLTES,
supra note 53, at 518.
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lie simply in a guarantee of order and stability; rather, it is inextricably bound to the promotion of the moral integrity of humanity. Unlike the abject subservience proffered by despotic regimes,
the legitimate State is founded upon the willing consent of all its
members who see in its structure the possibility of inserting their
full intrinsic nature into the Historical process. The institution of
a legitimate civil society through the social contract enables mankind to make up for its historical losses by gaining the possibility
of developing its moral capacities:
This passage from the state of nature to the civil state brings
about a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice
for instinct as [the rationale] of his conduct, and giving his
actions [a] moral [quality] that they lacked before. It is only
then that, the voice of duty replacing physical impulsion and
law [replacing] appetite, man, who until then had only regarded himself, sees himself constrained to act on other principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his passions.
Although he deprives himself in this state of many advantages
that nature has given him, he gains such great ones, his faculties
awaken and develop, his ideas widen, his sentiments become
more noble, his whole soul is lifted up to such a point that, if
the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him
below that one from which he came, he should bless unceasingly
the happy moment that forever pulled him out of it and which,
from a limited and stupid animal, made an intelligent being and
a man. 2
By consenting to the provisions of the act of association, man
bridges the historical gap between the state of nature and civil
society; he registers his common voluntary consent to distance
himself from his natural independence and to establish a new and
immutable political order, thereby transforming himself into a
moral political collectivity, the members of which simultaneously
acquire mutual rights and obligations. Mankind's consent to the
social contract is a gradual process which is accompanied by a
progressive awareness of the ultimate significance of the contract.
At first, man adheres to it because it corresponds to his selfinterest; he sees it as a means of protecting his property and
material goods. Then, he realizes that the guarantee of equality
has a collective advantage: it is a means of attaining the moral
birthright of humanity. By incorporating the principle of natural
equality into the social structure and stabilizing, as it were, the
92. Id. at 519.
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social inequalities among men, the social contract affords man
the possibility of moral development:
"To find a form of association which will defend and protect
with the whole common force the persons and the goods of each
associate, and by which each, uniting himself with all, nonetheless obeys [no one], but himself, and remains as free as before."
Such is the fundamental problem to which the social contract
provides the solution.
If therefore we discard from the social compact what is not
of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following
terms: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common
under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive
each member as an indivisible part of the whole."
At once, instead of the individual person of each contractant, this act of association creates a moral and collective body,
composed of so many members as the assembly contains voters,
and which receives from this same act its unity, its common self,
its life and its will. This public person, which is so formed by
the union of all the others, .

.

. [is the] body politic.9"

Through his consent to the social contract, each individual
unites his will with the collective political consciousness, which
is personified by the general will-the unalterable and indivisible
expression of the common good which reigns supreme over the
entire political order. The general will embodies the vital principle of the State, the rule of Justice emanating from the will of all
and which applies to the conduct of all. By having their individual conduct conform to the laws which transpose the precepts of
the general will into the activity of the body politic, the citizens
acquire a moral dimension: they heed the counsel of reason and
the command of duty and learn to benefit from their collective
rights and obligations:
[W]hat man loses by the social contract . . . is his natural

liberty and an unlimited right to whatever tempts him and he
can succeed in getting; what he gains . . . is civil liberty and

all the property he possesses. In order to avoid being mistaken
about these compensations, we must distinguish clearly between natural liberty, which knows only the bounds of the individual's strength, and civil liberty, which is limited by the general will .

. ..

We might, over and above what precedes, add to the gains
of the civil state moral liberty, which alone makes man truly
93. Id. at 522-23.
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master of himself; for the impulse of appetite is slavery, and
obedience
to the law that we have prescribed to ourselves is
4
liberty.
Rousseau justifies the omnipotence of the general will by
claiming that it represents no more than a principle of self-rule;
the people, who retain inalienable and indivisible sovereignty
within the State, simply are exercising sovereign authority upon
themselves. By proclaiming themselves to be equal and by constituting a national political body-the people, the men of the social
contract, in effect, simultaneously are part of the sovereign who
rules the State and also the members of the physical body of the
State. They exercise power over themselves through the legislative authority, the source of laws, which are valid rules for the
entire body politic.
Rousseau's theoretical State structure unquestionably allows
mankind to effectuate a salutary transition from an original
primitive state of existence to the advanced form of cultural
existence within the political community. The social contract
brings man to an awareness of his humanity-transforming him
into a partisan of an accommodation between the development
of his natural moral qualities and his increasing cultural sophistication. The sublimation of man and of his nature are attained in
the transcending moral ideology of the political order, when the
collective identity subsumes the individuality of each man and
makes it consubstantial with the moi commun of the political
order. The citizens of the Rousseauian State enjoy freedom so
long as their conduct conforms to the imperatives of the moral
conscience of the State-a constraint which they have imposed
upon themselves voluntarily:
In effect, each individual can, as a man, have a particular
will contrary or dissimilar to the general will that he has as a
citizen: his particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to
the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which
will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome
to himself; and regarding the moral person who constitutes the
State as a being of reason, because not a man, he would benefit
from the rights of the citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties
of the subject; an injustice the progress of which would cause the
ruin of the body politic.
94. Id. at 524.
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In order then that the social compact may not be an empty
formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can
give force to the rest, that whosoever refuses to obey the general
will, shall be compelled to do so by the whole body: this means
nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; such is the
condition which . . . alone legitimizes civil obligations."
Therefore, by abandoning his primitive independence and creating a political culture which accounts for the intrinsic features of'
his nature, man allows himself to reap the full benefits of his
natural predisposition to morality. Instead of responding instinctively to animalistic instincts or living in servitude, men yield
only to the coercion of laws grounded in a transcendent morality,
in the expression of their own will as a human community.
Within the framework of Rousseau's political writings, the
State theory elaborated in The Social Contract is Rousseau's response to the historical despair of the Discourse on Inequality.
With the emergence of the concepts of the social contract and the
general will in Rousseau's political vision, man's nature no longer
is flouted by the fortuitous events of History-nor is he condemned to live in a state of perpetual moral corruption. Moreover, man in the original state of nature is seen for what he really
was: a primitive and solitary human being who, like other animals, was incapable of engaging in conduct having any moral
implications. With the rehabilitation of civil society, man acquires the Historical possibility of mastering his reason and acquiring an authentic moral consciousness-an accurate awareness of himself. As an evolved rational being, man has the right,
indeed the obligation, of living within a political culture worthy
of his moral potential and which also accounts for his heritage to
freedom and equality. In a word, the political order does not
alienate man, but rather the State becomes the protector and
guarantor of the common well-being of humanity.
As has been apparent throughout his political writings, Rousseau's conception of the State and the legal order that it represents reveal a very close affinity between his thought and traditional natural law doctrine. The basic task of his writing has been
to incorporate the notion of a transcending morality into the positive political culture of mankind. The formulation of the notion
of the general will and its status as the ultimate source of legitimacy for positive legal and political institutions attests even more
95. Id. at 523-24.
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closely to Rousseau's participation in the natural law tradition.
Rousseau believed, as did the ancient Greeks, the medieval scholastics, and some of the more modern proponents of natural law
theory, that the political community should enable man to reach
his highest moral development by having his conduct and his
positive institutions conform to the precepts of transcending Justice.
It is equally apparent, however, that, unlike his predecessors,
Rousseau's natural law thinking reflected a deep personal dilemma, namely his preoccupation, both conscious and subconscious, with his inability to adapt to the outside world or, perhaps
more accurately, his inability to have the outside world mirror
the values that were his, which he thought were the natural and
universal birthright of mankind. The quest to elaborate a plan for
the moral salvation of men by providing them with an ideal political structure cannot be separated from, indeed it cannot be understood properly without a reference to, Rousseau's autobiographical writings in which he transposes a latent sense of guilt
into a purportedly altruistic defense of his personality and individual temperament. Rousseau's unabating belief in his privileged status as a natural man and his overwhelming need for
intimacy and transparency between his innermost being and the
external reality are indispensable to the proper assessment of all
his writings-be they autobiographical or political. Although the
explicitly personal epistemology renders his theory more vulnerable to attack, in this sense also Rousseau is part of the natural
law tradition. Like Plato, Aquinas, and Grotius, he built his vision of the law around the elevated and noble convictions that he
held about man based upon his intrinsic sense of his own humanity. Like them, he was not afraid to express his faith in a benevolent and meaningful universe without looking for support in empirical data or hiding behind the security of a tightly knit and
intentionally limited logical structure. Rousseau's most significant contribution to natural law thinking, however, lies elsewhere
than in his conformity to its salient characteristics. The link between Rousseau's State theory and his literary preoccupations
goes to the very heart of his political thinking and actually reveals
a face of natural law doctrine which had gone unnoticed, or at
least escaped the explicit commentary of both its proponents and
its critics.
Although men are free to act morally within the Rousseauian
political order and are equal, the institution of the moral political
community is attained apparently at the price of destroying their
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personal identity. Before the creation of the general will, men are
distinct individual beings; after its creation, they lose both their
natural independence and their individual personality. The creation and maintenance of a transcending moral ideology within the
State demand not only that the citizens coexist with the collectivity, but also that they become consubstantial with the political
order. The citizens undoubtedly are equal, but their freedom,
their right to assert their individual discretion, is almost completely circumscribed, subsumed into the impersonal order of the
State-limited to a choice between conforming their conduct to
the fundamental and unbending moral precepts of the State or
incurring punishment. Rousseau successfully bridges the gap between the potential morality and the cultural evolution of man,
but only by eliminating all possible deviations from the moral
standard of the political order. His solution, then, bears a remarkable affinity to the method he would use to resolve the tension
he perceived between himself and his fellow man in the
Confessions. There as well, he could admit of no blame or fault
in his own personality; the dilemma had arisen because the others
were socially corrupt and unable to understand what was right
and just; finally, any reconciliation was to take place on Rousseau's terms-by having the individuality of others come to mirror his own. In The Social Contract, Rousseau's personality acquires its first expression in the form of an ideal political order.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The drawbacks and personal tone of Rousseau's political
writings, however, do not leave his political thinking or the natural law tradition which it represents devoid of merit. Rousseau,
as a natural law advocate, discerned in man the quintessential
qualities of humanity and argued that the political order should
be founded upon principles which express man's highest human
potential-not his wanton depravity. In considering the problem
of the gap between a transcendent morality and the positive legal
order, he aimed at conceiving a State in which man could achieve
his sublimation and deploy his full moral being. The only legitimate form of political coercion consisted in restrictions which
established equality among men and promoted their freedom to
conform to their moral birthright and destiny. What Rousseau
and other natural law theorists were attempting to do was to
accomplish the superhuman feat of reconciling the contradistinctive elements of man's human nature-his potential for morally good conduct and his propensity for immoral behavior. Rous-
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seau's political thought adds another dimension to the natural
law tradition, namely that its exuberant optimism about man
carries within it the seeds of its own destruction, as it were, that
it not only relegates itself to fulfilling a role of general guidance
in relation to the positive law, but also that it contains an implicit
sense, a message about man's metaphysical dilemma.
Rousseau's contribution to elucidating the ultimate significance of the natural law teaching is brought out by the literary
tone which underpins his political writings. His State theory, like
his attempt to achieve a personal reconciliation between himself'
and his fellow men, was destined to fall short of transposing the
dream which it was meant to express. The writer of fiction is
presumed to be aware of the limitations of his art and of the
general infirmity of human capacities; he knows that the fullness
of his dreams finds only an approximate expression within the
contours of the written word. Moreover, the dynamic character
and the diversity of reality frustrate the artist's attempt to stabilize reality's essence and to transpose it into the confines of a
literary work.
The utopian moment that Rousseau attempted to consecrate
forever in his vision of the State occurs at the fugitive moment
when men are consenting to the terms of the social contract. In
those few and fleeting moments which immediately precede the
birth of civil society, time comes to a momentary standstill-the
tension between the dichotomous tendencies of the human personality, between the individual's egocentric concerns and his
desire for brotherhood, abates; seemingly, a fully balanced and
perfectly transparent harmony instills itself between the personal
individuality of each man and the collective personality of the
political order. The time of existence stabilizes and is filled with
the feeling of serenity that emanates from the coexistence of the
opposed features of human and political existence. The plenitude
of the social contract, however, is without the bounds of History,
located in an impalpable time frame, within the imperceptible
gulf that separates the present and the past time. It has no historical temporality of its own; it serves as an imperfect juncture
between two of the principal modalities of time. As a consequence, the moment of utopian felicity cannot be integrated into
History; once the gap is bridged between the past and the present, once the particular wills of the individual contractants are
fused into the general will, the balance between the individual
identity of men and the collective personality of the State is
irretrievably lost: the political order becomes immutable and in-

158

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 3:123

divisible and is devoid of deference to the individual. As with the
autobiographical writings, the political enterprise results inevitably in the disintegration of the moment of plenitude once it enters
into the boundaries of real experience. Even through the imaginary fabric of literary works, a man cannot reconstruct a past
which is free of unwanted faults and have it pass for his real self;
he cannot transpose an idyllic existential moment in which he is
at one with the sensation of being into the framework of real life.
Nor can he, despite the shift in focus of the classical political
discourse, invent a political order which heralds the consubstantiality of man and the State and hope to have the individuality
of man come out of it intact. Once the dreams of the writer or
political theorist confront reality in its positive manifestations, he
only can hope that the energy of his vision will enlighten the
conduct of man, serving as a general guide in the establishment
of human institutions. Although utopian speculations speak most
eloquently of man's human potential, their transcription into the
reality of human existence is destined to be only approximate;
they, thereby, point to the inevitable metaphysical dilemma with
which man must contend.

